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ABSTRACT
Competitive localization is present in an extreme form in one-dimensional
spatial models; each brand faces only two rivals no matter how many brands are
on the market. A test that does not require unrealistically long data series
is proposed for detecting the presence of localized competition in markets
with differentiated products, and a simple technique for assessing the nature
and importance of such localization is presented. Applications of these
methods to data on the U.S. ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry suggests
their potential value in other contexts.
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1. Introduction
Two polar-case models of market demand and seller interaction emerged
roughly simultaneously as economists began to study product differentiation
systematically: the spatial model of Hotelling (1929) and the symmetric model
usually associated with Chamberlin (1933). The spatial framework stresses
buyer heterogeneity; additional brands make it more likely that any particular
buyer will find a single one well-suited to his or her tastes. Symmetric
models usually involve a representative buyer who is imagined to buy all
brands and to benefit directly from increased variety. Both polar cases
appear frequently in the modern literature: compare the spatial analyses of
Salop (1979) and Schmalensee (1978) with the symmetric models of Spence (1976)
and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
In the original Hotelling model, with sellers arrayed along a line in
geographic or product space, rivalry is localized in the sense that each brand
faces only a small number of direct competitors, no matter how many sellers
are present in the market as a whole. This sort of localization can convert
an apparently large-numbers situation into one of overlapping oligopolies, so
that overall market concentration may be a seriously misleading indicator of
the likelihood of non-competitive behavior. In symmetric models, on the other
hand, each firm affects and is affected by all others in a symmetric fashion,
so that the fact of product differentiation has no effect on the pattern of
rivalry, and concentration may be measured on a market-wide basis.
While one-dimensional models of the Hotelling variety are useful for
illustraing the implications of localization, they build in an extreme form of
this effect. As Archibald and Rosenbluth (1975) have shown, localization need
not be important or even present in spatial models of higher dimensionality.
Thus, even if one accepts the persuasive arguments of Archibald, Eaton, and
Lipsey (1982) that "address models," in which brands are identified by their
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locations in the space of possible products, generally provide the right frame-
work for the study of differentiated markets, one is led to the conclusion
that the importance of localization in any particular differentiated market is
an empirical question. This essay is concerned with developing techniques for
answering such questions. It is thus intended as a contribution to the grow-
ing literature on econometric analysis of individual markets.
With enough data, of course, one could assess the importance of locali-
zation by examining the coefficients of estimated unrestricted brand-specific
demand functions. In such functions, each brand's sales would depend on such
things as the price, advertising, and lagged sales of all brands on the market,
along with variables such as income that would influence total market demand.
But this approach encounters a serious problem of dimensionality: if there
are a substantial number of brands, each brand's equations will have many
unknown parameters, and unrealistically long data series would be required to
obtain reliable estimates. The existing literature in economics provides no
alternative approaches that are noticeably less data-intensive.
Most the relevant econometric work in marketing simply assumes a symmetric
model of the sort employed below.1 On the other hand, marketers commonly
construct "perceptual maps" that depict individual brands' locations in
2
product space. For a variety of reasons, including the difficulty of
interpreting distances in such maps, these and related techniques are not
generally usable by an economist interested in the overall importance of
localization in any particular market.
The approach taken here sidesteps the dimensionality problem that plagues
unrestricted brand-specific demand systems by focusing on the residual covar-
iance matrix obtained under a fairly general symmetric specification. That
specification is presented in Section 2, and a large-sample likelihood-ratio
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test for departures from symmetry is derived. A simple technique for asses-
sing the pattern and overall importance of.localization is presented in
Section 3. Section 4 describes the application of this approach to data on
the U.S. ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry.
2. Testing for Localization
Consider a market in which N brands of some product are sold. Consider a
change in an observable or unobservable variable that has the direct effect of
making brand i more attractive to buyers. Examples would be an increase in
i's advertising, a reduction in its price, a shift in buyer preferences toward
i, and (for normal goods) an increase in consumer income. I interpret the
absence of localization (i.e., perfect symmetry) to require that such changes
not affect the ratio of brand j's sales to brand k's sales, for all j,ki. 3
Changes in relative sales would reflect substitution patterns derived from
departures from symmetry in the pattern of brands' locations in product space,
and the null hypotheses of no localization rules out such departures.
Under perfect symmetry, changes in "market-wide" variables (such as
consumer income) that affect the level of total market demand must leave all
market shares unchanged. The implied multiplicative separability of brand-
specific demand function then allows us to neglect such variables when working
with market shares and leads naturally to the use of what has been called an
"attraction" model to determine those shares:
n
(1) M i = i(Xi' ui)/ Z j(Xi, uj),
j=l1
where Mi is brand i's market share, i is its non-negative "attraction,"
(the part of its demand function not involving "market-wide" variables), X.
1
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is a vector of observable predetermined variables that directly affect the
demand for brand i, and u is a disturbance term. If (1) is correctly
specified, the X. must include variables that provide a complete description
of sellers' marketing activity. The disturbances are most naturally inter-
preted as summarizing the effects of unobservable variables that directly
affect each brand's attractiveness and that change during the sample period.
This interpretation is central to our approach, as we restrict the u to
affect market shares only through changes in ..
Functions like (1) relate market shares to prices in the symmetric
representative-individual models of Spence (1976, Sect. 5) and Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) that employ generalized CES utility functions. (Not all
symmetric utility functions are consistent with (1), of course.) Since
consumers' tastes appear to differ, and all consumers do not buy all brands in
most markets, a more plausible interpretation of (1) and of the null hypo-
thesis of perfect symmetry is the following. As was noted above, in "address
models" of high dimensionality, the pattern of buyer and brand "addresses"
need not imply the existence or importance of competitive localization.
Precise conditions on the patterns of buyers' tastes and brands' attributes
sufficient to rule out localization in such models are not known, however.
Moreover, direct verification of any such conditions would almost certainly
require both large quantities of data on individual brands and buyers and the
use of strong maintained hypotheses. The argument here is that if the
patterns of tastes and attributes in any particular market are such as to
render localization absent or unimportant, an equation like (1) should provide
a good approximation to aggregate behavior. (Note that such models have the
important property that predicted shares are always between zero and one and
5
always sum to one. )
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In order to go farther, it is necessary to make assumptions about the
disturbance terms. It is convenient and not unusually restrictive to assume
that the ui are jointly normally distributed with zero means and that the
Yi(Xi, ui) may be written as 4i(Xi)exp(ui). Under this last assumption, if
we use brand N as the base brand, take logarithms of (1) and subtract, we
obtain:
(2) ln[Mi/MN] = ln[4i(Xi)] - ln[ N(N)] + (ui - uN), il,...N-l
If the i have a finite number of unknown parameters, this system of equa-
tions can be jointly estimated by standard methods. If the u follow
autoregressive processes with the same coefficients, quasi-differencing can be
used to eliminate serial correlation, and the coefficients of the autoregres-
sive process can be estimated along with the parameters of i.
If sufficient data are available, one can test the null hypothesis of no
localization by using (2) to test the restrictions that only i and N
affect (Mi/MN), i = 1,...,N-l. Though such a test is simple to describe,
it is likely to involve a heavy computational burden and unlikely to have much
power when N is large.
An alternative, simpler test flows from the fact that the assumptions
above imply that E[ui(t)uj(t)] must be equal for all i j. The argu-
ment is just an application of the definition of perfect symmetry given above
to the unobservable determinants of brands' attractions. If there is no
localization and the demand system is properly specified, the unobservable
determinants must reflect either industry-wide or brand-specific factors. (If
the system is properly specified, all important marketing variables are
included in the Xi, so that significant unobservable firm-wide marketing
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changes by multi-brand firms are ruled out. Taste changes that affect subsets
of the set of brands are ruled out by the null hypothesis of no localization.)
Under our definition of perfect symmetry, an increase in ui caused by a
change in either type of factor cannot be associated with a change in (uj - uk)
in (2) for any j i k, since otherwise the relative sales of brands j and k
would be affected. But this is easily seen to require that the covariance of
Ui and u be identical for all i and j, as asserted.
Let be the (N-l)x(N-1) covariance matrix (assumed constant over time)
of the disturbances in (2) with typical element ij. Let Vi be the variance
of ui, let Z be the covariance between ui and uj for all i j, and let
v.i = Vi - Z for i = 1,...,N. Then the argument of the preceding paragraph
implies that il = v.i + vN and aij = vN for i # j. By considering the
covariance matrix of the ui, it is easy to see that at most one of the vi
can be negative if they are all distinct. This constraint is difficult to
impose, however. We lose little generality by requiring that all the vi be
non-negative.
We can test for departures from perfect symmetry by estimating a system
like (2) with an unconstrained contemporaneous disturbance covariance matrix
and then using the residual covariance matrix to test for the validity of the
restrictions given by (3). We employ the asymptotic distribution of a likeli-
hood ratio statistic, so that the test has the usual large-sample properties.
We lose none of those properties by treating the parameters of the i as
known in deriving the test. The residual covariance matrix, S, with typical
element s.., is thus treated in what follows as having been generated by
observations from a multivariate normal distribution with covariance matrix
Z and zero mean vector.
Under this assumption, the (N-l)x(N-l) matrix S has the Wishart distribu-
tion, and the log-likelihood function is the following:
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(3) L = C - (T/2)ln IZI + [(T-N)/2]ln ISI - (T/2)tr(Z1 S),
where C is a constant and T is the number of observations. The unrestricted
maximum of L, Lu, is obtained by setting = S.
It is straightforward (but extremely tedious) to show that the first-order
conditions for a restricted maximum of L with respect to the estimates vi under
the null hypothesis are the following:
(4a) vi = sii + VN[l 2(DFi/F)], i=l,...,N-l, and
(4b) vN (F - D)/D , where
N-1
(4c) Fi Z sji/vj, i=l,...,N-1
N-1
(4d) F = Z Fi/vi, and
i=1
N-1
(4e) D = Z (1/vi).
i=l
These equations may be solved iteratively. (A consistent starting point may be
obtained by taking vN as the average of the off-diagonal elements of S.)
Substitution into (3) gives the restricted maximum of the log-likelihood
function, L .
The likelihood-ratio statistic for testing the null hypothesis of no
localization is then just
(5a) X = -2 (Lr - Lu) = T ln(IZrl / ISI), where
N-l^
(5b) IL r i ( v(l + VND).
i=l
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The unrestricted maximum involves N(N-1)/2 parameters, while the restricted
maximum involves N parameters, so that X is asymptotically distributed as
X2 with N(N-3)/2 degrees of freedom.
In order to apply this localization test, one must complete the specifi-
cation of (2) by making assumptions about the Xi and the i.' Since
those assumptions are inevitably somewhat arbitrary, we encounter a classic
problem, variants of which arise in most applied econometric work: rejection
of the null hypothesis of symmetry may be signalling that the wrong symmetric
model has been employed, not that the true model involves localization. The
problem of specification uncertainty does not have a definitive solution, here
in general, but several points seem worth noting in this context.
First, in selecting a symmetric specification for testing, one should be
unusually reluctant to impose restrictions that lack strong a priori support.
Over-parameterization robs the localization test of some power, but misspecifi-
cation is likely to bias it toward rejecting symmetry. Second, if localiza-
tion is present, all symmetric models are misspecified. Failure to find a
symmetric model that passes all (formal and informal) specification tests not
involving localization may mean that the investigator lacks adequate data or
ingenuity, or it may simply mean that localization is present. Third, if the
residuals-based localization test described above rejects symmetry because
localization is present, not because the wrong symmetric specification has
been employed, the pattern of residuals ought to imply plausible patterns of
localization. If such patterns are detected by the diagnostic technique
described below, one's confidence in the presence of localization should be
increased. Finally, the localization test provides a new specification test
that should be applied to symmetric market share models before they are used
for forecasting or other purposes. Rejection of symmetry always signals
misspecification of one sort or another.
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3. Assessing Patterns of Localization
If the localization test rejects the null hypothesis of symmetry in some
market, it still seems reasonable to retain, at least provisionally, the
assumption that market shares depend only on the i(Xi,ui) even though (1)
does not hold. In such a generalized attraction model, the pattern of compet-
itive effects is the same for all brand-specific marketing variables, like
price and advertising. An asymmetric generalized attraction model seems a
plausible representation of an "address model" with localization, in which the
effects of changes in the i on the relative sales of rival brands reflect
and summarize the patterns of brand and buyer locations in product space.
In such a model, the development in Schmalensee (1982, Sect. 2) suggests
that the following quantities can be used to analyze the nature and importance
of localization:
(6) Kij = -[(1- Mi)(aMj/aQi)]/[Mj(aMi/ai)], ijj,j=l,...,N.
In the symmetric model, equation (1), it is easy to see that the Kij all
equal unity. In general, the adding-up restriction on the Mi requires the
Mj-weighted averages of the Kij to equal unity for all i. If one of the
K.. exceeds unity, it implies that increases in brand i's share come more at
the expense of brand j than a symmetric model would predict. Direct examina-
tion of the Kij can thus yield information on patterns of localization.
Moreover, Schmalensee (1982) presents a measure, G*, of the market-wide
importance of localization that involves only the Kij and the Mi.
Under the generalized attraction assumption, the same pattern of
localization applies to both observable and unobservable variables. We can
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thus use prediction errors to describe localization as well to test for its
presence. Given the difficulties of estimating more general models in small
samples, we consider the use of statistics derived from estimation of equa-
tions (2). Since these equations are misspecified if localization is present,
such an approach can yield diagnostic information, but not rigorously defen-
sible estimates. (All this is in the spirit of the diagnostic techniques
presented by Phlips (1974, pp. 212-17)).
Let l2, with typical element ij be the singular covariance matrix of the
tit = Mit - Mit, the differences between actual shares and those predicted by
the symmetric model. I want to argue that for diagnostic purposes it is
reasonable to substitute (ij/wii) for the ratio of derivatives in (6).
The intuitive rationale for this approach is that one would expect a
larger than average negative covariance between the shares of brands that are
closer than average substitutes, as buyers are more likely than average to
substitute one for the other as market conditions vary. More formally, we
estimate the ratio of structural derivatives in (6) by an expected ratio of
changes. Suppose that i's share increases by an amount A due to factors
that are either unobservable or excluded from (2) by virtue of the assumption
of symmetry. The extent to which this is expected to be at the expense of
brand j's share is given by E[(jt- ei)/ - ) I ( it A]. Under
normality, treating the mean prediction errors (the i) as known, this
expression equals (w ij/ii) for any A.
Note also that since actual and predicted market shares always sum to-one,
the it always sum to zero across i, as do the si. This implies that the
row and column sums of 2 are zero, and this in turn implies that the Mj-weighted
averages of the estimated Kj equal one for all i.
1j.
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4. An Application to Breakfast Cereals
In the course of antitrust proceeding involving the leading U.S. producers
of ready-to-eat breakfast cereals, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
obtained a good deal of monthly brand-specific data from the major pro-
ducers.1 0 For the 40-month period from September, 1969 through December,
1972, the FTC data contain sales (factory shipments), wholesale list prices,
and advertising outlays for the four largest producers, along with some
information on the other two national sellers.ll These six firms, which
accounted for over 97% of U.S. cereal sales in 1970 (Berman 1981, p. 64), had
over 70 brands in national distribution during this period.
It would clearly not be possible to examine localization by estimating an
unrestricted demand system involving all brands on the market. Even system
estimation of our symmetric model (2) using all brands is computationally
infeasible. Accordingly, we chose to work exclusively with the 11 leading
brands listed in Table 1. These were the only brands that individually
accounted for at least two percent of industry dollar sales in each of the
four years 1969-1972. As Table 1 indicates, these brands in aggregate
accounted for just under half the six leading firms' total cereal revenues
during this period.
Under the null hypothesis of perfect symmetry, if equations (1) and (2)
hold in some market, one can estimate (2) and perform a valid test for local-
ization using any subset of the brands on the market. On the other hand, if
localization is present, the power of the test depends on which subset of
brands is used. In a market with clusters of closer-than-average substitutes,
power would be low if all brands analyzed were in the same cluster or all were
in different clusters. On that reasoning, our test should have adequate power
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here; brands 7 and 9 are raisin brans, brands 3, 8, and 11 are pre-sweetened
cereals consumed heavily by children, and brands 6 and 10 are aimed at buyers
especially concerned with nutrition.
Following most of the relevant literature, we assume that i are
Cobb-Douglas functions, so that equations (2) are linear:
(7) ln[4i(t)] = ai + Biln[Ai(t)] + yiln[Pi(t)] + iln[Mi(t-l)], i=l,... N,
where A is advertising spending., P is price, and M is market share in pounds
of cereral sold. The lagged share term represents an attempt to capture the
effects of buyer inertia. (This is algebraically equivalent here to the use
of lagged pound sales.) Using three different base brands (as discussed
below), F-tests decisively rejected the commonly-imposed restriction that the
B's, y's and 6's were the same for all brands.
Reported wholesale list prices were used for the Pi(t). Although these
firms generally did not depart from list price during most of the 1960's,
"trade deals," short-term discuonts below list price, were used with increas-
ing frequency during our sample period (Berman 1981, pp. 106-13). This is a
possible source of specification error, as such "deals" cannot be treated as
exogenous, random events.
The reported advertising series exhibited large month-to-month fluctua-
tions (10 of 11 coefficients of variation above 0.30) and contained two
negative observations. As Aaker, Carman and Jacobsen (1982) discuss, these
features of the advertising series undoubtedly reflect billing and accounting
practices that cause short-term timing differences between the appearance of
ads and the manufacturer's payment for them. In an attempt to eliminate the
effects of random timing differences, we applied a moving average filter, with
II
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weights of 0.2 on the next month and the last month and 0.6 on the current
month. (These weights were chosen in part so as to eliminate the negative
observations.) Use-of this filter, along with the presence of lagged vari-
ables in our specifications, reduced the number of observations to 38.
Given firms' information and decision-making lags, it seems plausible to
treat both price and advertising as predetermined in monthly data of this
sort. Accordingly, estimates of (2), using (7), were computed using iterated
generalized least squares ("seemingly unrelated regressions") for three
different choices of the base brand, brand N in equations (2): the largest
(Kellogg's Corn Flakes), the smallest (Kellogg's Froot Loops), and a medium-
12
sized non-Kellogg brand (General Mills' Wheaties). Coefficient estimates
were not very sensitive to the choice of the base brand.1 3
The model's explanatory power varied considerably across brands, though
14
not across the three sets of estimates. R-square statistics for the
differences between the logarithms of shares varied from 0.89 (Special K --
Froot Loops) to -0.07 (Rice Krispies -- Wheaties). Only two of the 30 R 2's
computed were negative, while 20 exceeded 0.10.
As might be expected, given the large number of parameters estimated with
short data series, slope coefficients were not generally both significant and
of the expected sign. Eight of the 11 estimated B's were negative with all
three bases, and either five or six of the estimated y's were positive.
Only one positive exceeded twice its standard error, along with four or five
negative estimates. No negative y's were significant; either one or three
positive estimates had t-statistics above two. Seven of the 11 's were
positive with all three bases, none ever exceeded unity, and between three and
five positive 6's had t's above two. Overall, these were hardly superb
results, but, in view of our sample size and model complexity, they did not
seem to provide a decisive signal of misspecification.
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Application of the localization test derived in Section 2 to the three
residual covariance matrices does provide such a signal. The vi are generally
insensitive to choice of base brand, and the estimates for Kellogg brands are
generally much smaller than for the others. The three values of X vary
between 151.4 and 155.8. As X is distributed as X 2(44) under the null
hypothesis of perfect symmetry, with 0.5% critical value equal to 72, these are
all highly significant. The evidence so far seems to indicate strongly that
the assumption of no localization made in (2) is invalid in the U.S.
ready-to-eat breakfast cereals industry.
Application of the diagnostic technique described in Section 3 to this
model's prediction errors yields a surprisingly large number of negative
estimted Kij with all three base brands. Negative estimates might arise if
exogenous, unmeasured shocks affected the attractiveness of groups of close
substitute brands as against all others. For example, large shifts in buyers'
preferences for raisins might be expected to cause the sales of brands 7 and 9
(the two raisin brans) in our sample move together. If one could identify
such influences during the sample period, and if the pattern of negative K..
1j
made sense in light of those influences, one might be led to conclude that
Kij < 0 implies an unusually close substitute relation between brands i
and j.
Such exogenous, group-specific disturbances do not appear to be at work
here, however. For all three sets of estimates, if brands i and j are either
both Kellogg brands or both non-Kellogg brands, Kij is always negative,
while if i is a Kellogg brand and j is not, Ki is always positive. This
same pattern generally holds when simpler specifications, for which symmetry
is always decisively rejected, are used to generate predicted shares. It is
hard to see how this sign pattern could be reflecting localization, since both
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Kellogg and non-Kellogg sets contain brands in most of the "segments" (raisin
brans, pre-sweetened, nutritional, etc.) discussed by industry observers. It
seems much more likely that we have either failed to observe important market-
ing variables (such as the departures from list price noted above) that affect
all Kellogg brands together, or that there are differences in accounting or
reporting practices between Kellogg and the other firms that give rise to
spurious movements in measured relative sales.1 6
Since the null hypothesis of symmetry is essentially the hypothesis that
all K.. equal one, it is intuitively clear that that null hypothesis was
1J
rejected here mainly because of the negative estimated Kij (corresponding to
positive residual covariances) within the Kellogg and non-Kellogg sets. If,
as we have just argued, the estimated Kij likely reflect the absence of im-
portant variables or the presence of serious measurement problems, it follows
that the size of our localization test statistic, X, likely reflects specif-
ication problems unrelated to the presence of localization. In short, the
techniques developed in Sections 2 and 3 have detected misspecification that
would otherwise not have been apparent, but they have not done so in a fashion
that makes it possible to assert that localization is definitely involved.1 7
5. Conclusions
Section 2 presented an econometric test for the presence of localized
competition that does not require unusually large data sets. Section 3 pre-
sented a complementary technique for assessing the nature and importance of
such localization. Application of these methods to data on the U.S. ready-to-
eat breakfast cereal industry in Section 4 produced good news and bad news.
-16-
The good news is that our techniques revealed their ability to signal clearly
misspecification of commonly-employed symmetric market share models that would
otherwise not likely be detected. The bad news is that in this particular
application it was impossible to assert that the symmetric model examined was
misspecified because of the presence of localization, since the technique of
Section 3 signalled the presence of unrelated difficulties.
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Footnotes
* I am indebted to the National Science Foundation for financial
support, to William Burnett for considerable help with data problems,
to Jerry Hausman for many helpful conversations, and to Severin
Borenstein, Ian Ayres, and Michael Salinger for superb research
assistance. Earlier versions of this essay were presented at the
Universities of Chicago and Laval and at the 1983 North American
Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society. I am grateful to
participants in those sessions and to Timothy Bresnahan, Grayham
Mizon, Thomas Stoker, and anonymous referees for valuable comments.
Only the author can be blamed for residual infirmities.
1. Parsons and Schultz (1976, ch. 7) provide a survey; see Naert and
Weverberg (1981) for a recent example.
2. Alternative approaches to constructing such maps are discussed by Hauser
and Koppelman (1979), McAlister and Lattin (1983), and the references they
cite.
3. While this requirement has a strong formal resemblence to the choice-
theoretic axiom of "independence of irrelevant alternatives," individual
behavior here need not satisfy that axiom.
4. This is not strictly necessary for the absence of localization in
competitive interaction. It would suffice to have the definition in the
preceding paragraph apply only to the demand-determining variables under
sellers' control. Under this weaker definition, market-wide variables like
disposable income could enter the i in (1), below. It is very difficult
to imagine conditions that would produce perfect symmetry under this weaker
definition but not under the definition in the text, however, and that more
convenient definition is accordingly used in what follows.
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Footnotes (cont.)
5. On the implications of these restrictions, see Berndt and Savin (1975),
Bultez and Naert (1975), and the references they cite.
6. It seems somewhat more common in applied work to subtract the average of
all log-shares from each of the N logged equations and then delete one of the
resulting equation: see Bultz and Naert (1975) and Naert and Weverbergh
(1981). (Maximum likelihood estimates are invariant to the equation
deleted.) While that approach appears more "balanced" than the one employed
here, neither seems theoretically superior. Since the choice of a base in our
approach is essentially arbitrary, marked variation in parameter estimates
with the base brand employed signals problems with the demand specification.
(See footnote 13, below).
7. Berndt and Savin (1975) derive the restrictions on autoregressive
disturbance processes implied by the adding-up constraint.
8. Theil (1975, pp. 318-20) follows this same approach in a very similar
context. Jueland (1980) deals with estimation of (2) subject to the
restrictions derived above, using a consistent estimator of that is not
maximum-likelihood. Use of such constrained estimates in a test procedure
would complicate computation and yield no asymptotic benefits.
9. For general discussion of specification uncertainty and its implications,
see Leamer (1978) and Feldstein (1982).
10. The extent of localization was an issue in that case; see Schmalensee
(1978) and Berman (1981). The FTC data have also been employed by Aaker,
Carman, and Jacobsen (1982); they provide additional descriptive information.
11. The four largest firms, who were initially charged in the FTC's antitrust
action, are those appearing in Table 1. Quaker was later dropped from the
case and the case itself was finally dropped by the FTC. The other two
national sellers were Nabisco and Ralston.
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Footnotes (cont.)
12. We were unable to obtain convergence for any (nonlinear) generalizations
of this model involving quasi-differencing to eliminate serial correlation. A
number of observations indicate that our inability to allow explicitly for
serial correlation is not a serious problem here, however. First, despite the
lagged dependent variable in (17), estimation of (2) does not involve the
standard lagged dependent variable problems because because of the
cross-equation constraints on 6N. Second, serial correlation was not
generally estimated to be important in models that imposed equal slope
coefficients across brands. Third, 26 of the 30 single-equation Durbin-
Watson statistics were between 1.5 and 2.5, and 20 were between 1.7 and 2.3.
This is reassuring, even though the DW statistic cannot be used for formal
testing here. Fourth, one expects estimates of the 6's to be biased away
from zero by serial correlation, but 10 of 11 estimates were between -0.24 and
+0.58 for all three base brands. (The outlier, 611' was always between
0.82 and 0.85.) Finally, our main interest here is in residual convariances,
which need not be strongly biased by the presence of serial correlation.
13. As was observed in footnote 7, above, coefficient estimates should not
vary markedly with the choice of base brand if the specification is correct.
Comparing pairs of base brands, the three correlation coefficients for the 11
estimated 's were between .96 and .99, for y's between .77 and .90, for
6's between .79 and .98, and for 's (setting aN-O) between .90 and
.95. The weakest relation was always between estimates using Froot Loops and
Wheaties bases. We also considered variation relative to estimation
precision. Let xi, i=l, 2, or 3, be the estimate of some coefficient
th
obtained using the i base brand, and let hi be the reciprocal of the
corresponding squared standard error. Then if the specification is correct,
one would expect the following statistic to be small relative to the
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Footnotes (cont.)
13. (cont.) chi-square distributive with two degrees of freedom:
C2 Z hi[xi - (hixi/hi)] .2 Only one of the 11 values of C exceeded one for
B, y or 6. Only C2 for 67 exceeded two. (This statistic cannot be
computed for the al's.) In contrast, the imposition of slope equality across
all brands produced C2 s of 9.98 for B and 42.30 for 6.
14. Only R2's involving pairs of base brands are directly comparable among
2
the three sets of estimates, but these are quite stable. The R for the
differences between the logarithms of brand l's and brand 11's shares was .755
when brand 1 was used as a base and .743 when brand 11 was the base. The
corresponding two R 2's for brands 1 and 5 were .058 and .041, and the values
for brands 5 and 11 were .269 and .305.
15. Pairwise correlations among the three sets of vi's range from .27 to .69.
If the two base brand estimates (vN's) are excluded in each case, the range is
from .64 to .85. The average v over all three bases is .0138 for the six
Kellogg brands and .0568 for the five non-Kellogg brands. This gap is widened
if base brand estimates are excluded.
16. These results suggest that data problems may go a long way toward ex-
plaining the surprisingly weak bivariate associations between advertising and
sales found by Aaker, Carman, and Jacobsen (1982) for a set of Kellogg brands.
17. See the discussion of misspecification at the end of Section 2. It should
be kept in mind that our data were compiled from the (presumably) uncoordinated
responses of the leading cereal producers to a broadly-worded request for data
from the FTC, which was in the proess of bringing a major antitrust case
against them. In retrospect, it is hard to imagine a procedure more likely to
make it difficult or impossible to avoid specification error in market-wide
models.
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Table 1
Leading Ready-to-Eat Cereal Brands
Used in Empirical Analysisa
Average Percentage Share
Industry Leaders'
Brand Company Brand Name Dollar Sales Pound Sales
1 Kellogg Kellogg's Corn Flakes 6.0 18.2
2 General Mills Cheerios 7.8 13.9
3 Kellogg Super Frosted Flakes 5.9 13.2
4 Kellogg Rice Krispies 7.2 12.3
5 General Mills Wheaties 3.6 7.8
6 Kellogg Special K 5.0 7.5
7 Kellogg Kellogg's Raisin Bran 2.6 6.8
8 Quaker Oats Cap'n Crunch 3.2 6.4
9 General Foods Post's Raisin Bran 2.2 5.7
10 General Mills Total 2.7 4.3
11 Kellogg Froot Loops 2.4 4.0
Totals: 48.6 100.0
a Dollar sales averages cover the years 1969-1972; pound sales averages
cover the period October, 1969 through November, 1972.
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